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Abstract—The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink in short) is
a communication protocol for unmanned systems (e.g., drones,
robots). It specifies a comprehensive set of messages exchanged
between unmanned systems and ground stations. This protocol is
used in major autopilot systems, mainly ArduPilot and PX4, and
provides powerful features not only for monitoring and control-
ling unmanned systems missions, but also for their integration
into the Internet. However, there is no technical survey and/or
tutorial in the literature that presents these features or explains
how to make use of them. Most of the references are online
tutorials and basic technical reports, and none of them presents
a comprehensive and a systematic coverage of the protocol. In this
paper, we address this gap, and we propose an overview of the
MAVLink protocol, the difference between its versions, and its
potential in enabling Internet connectivity to unmanned systems.
We also discuss security aspects of MAVLink. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first technical survey and tutorial on the
MAVLink protocol, which represents an important reference for
unmanned systems users and developers.
Index Terms—MAVLink, ArduPilot, PX4, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), Ground Control Stations (GCSs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned systems are autonomous platforms that can be
easily programmed to perform missions with or without the
intervention of a pilot. These systems can be aerial, also
known as drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ground
(UGV) or underwater. They typically communicate through
wireless with a ground control station (GCS) that monitors
their status and control their actions. UAVs embed special
hardware and software called autopilot that controls the motion
of the drone and monitors its status and used to communicate
with GCSs using telemetry or WiFi communication. There
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are many autopilot software platforms for UAVs available
including ArduPilot from 3DR [1], Paparazzi UAV [2] de-
veloped at Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile (ENAC),
Hangar autopilot [3], PX4 Flight Stack [4], MultiWii from
Nintendo [5] and several others. The most popular autopilot
software is ArduPilot, which is an open-source project effec-
tively maintained by a huge number of developers exceeding
400 contributors. It underpins different types of autonomous
systems, including fixed-wing planes, (heli, tri, quad, hexa,
and octo) copters, underwater vehicles and boats, and ground
vehicles. In the heart of the ArduPilot system, Micro Aerial
Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol is specified to ensure
the communication between the unmanned systems and the
ground stations. MAVLink is a well-established lightweight
message serialization protocol specified for the unmanned
vehicle systems, including drones. Lorenz Meier released
MAVLink in 2009 under the LGPL license. MAVLink is
designed as a Marshaling library, which means that it serializes
messages of the states of the system and the commands that it
has to execute into a specific binary format (i.e., a stream of
bytes), that is platform-independent. The binary serialization
nature of the MAVLink protocol makes it lightweight as
it has minimal overhead as compared to other serialization
techniques, (e.g., XML or JSON). The communication using
MAVLink is bidirectional between the ground station and
the unmanned system. Besides, given the binary serialization
feature of MAVLink, its messages are typically of small
sizes and can reliably be transmitted over different wireless
mediums, including WiFi or even serial telemetry devices with
low data rates. It also ensures the reliability and message
integrity by a double checksum verification, in its packet
header. All these features make the MAVLink protocol as the
most popular among its peers for the communication between
unmanned systems and GCS.
Despite its popularity and the large community of users
and developers, there is a significant lack of surveys about
this protocol. New users/developers get usually confused due
to the lack of structured references apart from some online
documentation of some basic concepts. The only existing
tutorial is entitled MAVLink Tutorial for Absolute Dummies
(Part I), since 2013 [6], (for which there is no part II!), which
is rather an basic introduction to the elementary concepts of
the MAVLink protocol. Also, in the last two recent years, there
has been much research works around the MAVLink protocol.
However, no survey discusses these works and classifies them.
Thus, there is a desperate need in the community for a
scientific research paper that provides both a tutorial and a
survey on the MAVLink protocol to be the first reference for
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users, researchers and developers on this protocol and unveils
the powerful features of this protocol and its main usages,
extensions, and applications.
This paper addresses this gap and provides a tutorial and
a survey of the MAVLink protocol. The tutorial deals with
presenting the main features of the MAVLink protocol and its
two versions MAVLink 1.0 and MAVLink 2.0, and the most
important messages specified in the protocol. In addition, we
present the different tools and Application Program Interfaces
(APIs) that developers need to parse and develop their control
station programs that communicate with the unmanned sys-
tems. The survey part of the paper deals with presenting and
discussing the main contributions proposed in the literature
around MAVLink, which we classify in different categories
including (i.) enhancement and extension (ii.) security, (iii.)
applications, (iv.) integration with the Internet-of-Things (IoT),
(v.) Multi-UAV coordination and swarm. To the best our
knowledge, this is the first and unique technical survey and
tutorial that deals with the MAVLink protocol, which repre-
sents an indispensable reference for unmanned systems’ users
and developers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents a general overview of the MAVLink protocol
versions 1.0 and 2.0 and their header formats. Section III
discusses the security threats and vulnerabilities of MAVLink
and presents the solutions proposed in the literature to address
these security problems. Section IV provides a comprehensive
state of the art that has contributed to the development of
MAVLink and its applications in different contexts. Section V
presents an overview of the software related to the MAVLink
protocol, including ground stations, and simulation models.
Section VI concludes the paper and discusses some future
challenges.
II. THE MAVLINK PROTOCOL
A. Overview
This section presents an overview of the MAVLink protocol,
namely the transport and communication protocols supported
in addition to the messages structures and serialization. In what
follows, we use MAVLink messages and MAVLink packets
interchangeably.
Note for readers: The following subsections present low-
level technical details about the protocol specification that
are needed for practitioners and MAVLink developers. These
details are summarized in tables whenever relevant.
B. Communication and Transport Protocols
The MAVLink protocol defines the mechanism on the struc-
ture of messages and how to serialize them at the application
layer. These messages are then forwarded to the lower layers
(i.e., transport layer, physical layer) to be transmitted to the
network. The advantage of the MAVLink protocol is that
it supports different types of transport layers and mediums
thanks to its lightweight structure. It can be transmitted
through WiFi, Ethernet (i.e., TCP/IP Networks) or serial
telemetry low bandwidth channels operating at sub-GHz fre-
quencies, namely 433 MHz, 868 MHz or 915 MHz. The sub-
GHz frequencies allow us to reach large communication ranges
to control the unmanned system remotely. The maximum
data rate can reach up 250 kbps, and the maximum range
is typically expected to be 500 m, but highly dependent on
the environment and level of noise and antenna setup. Table
I presents the features of some commonly used telemetry
devices.
The second alternative is to use a network interface, which is
typically WiFi or Ethernet, and stream the MAVLink messages
through IP Networks. In this case, the autopilot running the
MAVLink protocol typically supports both UDP and also TCP
connections at the transport layer between the ground station
and the drone, depending on the reliability level required by
the application. Of course, it is commonly known that UDP
is a datagram protocol that requires no connection between
the client and server and it has no mechanism to ensure that
messages are reliably delivered, but provides a fast lighter
weight alternative for real-time and loss-tolerant message
streaming. On the other hand, TCP is a reliable connection-
oriented protocol that provides better reliability of transfer
thanks to its acknowledgment mechanism but could be subject
to congestion and heavy management of the connection. The
choice of the transport protocol is left to the user depending on
the requirement he needs for the message exchange between
the unmanned system and the ground station.
C. Message Types and Structures
The unmanned system communicates with the ground sta-
tion through the exchange of MAVLink messages, which are
binary-serialized messages. Binary serialization means that
the content of the message is transformed into a sequence
of bytes to be transmitted through the network. The receiver
of the serialized message performs its deserialization in the
opposite direction to reconstitute the original message sent.
This property of binary serialization has a significant benefit
of reducing the size of the transmitted message to a maximum
as compared to other types of serialization, such as XML
or even the lighter weight JSON. Each MAVLink message
contains a header appended to the message payload. The
header carries out information about the message whereas the
payload includes the data transported by the message.
In the following section, we present the protocol headers
of MAVLink 1.0 and that of the newer MAVLink 2.0 [8] and
the difference between each other. In the remaining of the
paper, MAVLink refers to MAVLink 1.0 [9], unless otherwise
specified.
1) MAVLink 1.0 Protocol Header: As shown in Fig. 1 there
are eight important fields.
The first field is STX and refers to the symbol that represents
the start of a MAVLink frame. In MAVLink 1.0, STX is equal
to special symbol 0XFE. The second byte (LEN) represents
the message length in bytes and is encoded into 1 Byte. The
third byte (SEQ) denotes the sequence number of the message.
It is encoded into 1 Byte and takes values from 0 to 255.
Once it reaches 255, the sequence number is reset again to
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TABLE I: An overview comparison between Ardupilot telemetry devices [7]
Telemetry device Frequency Range Voltage Sensitivity RF transmit power
Bluetooth Between 2402 and 2480 MHz, or 2400 and 2483.5 MHz 50 m 3.6 to 6 V -80 dBm +4 dBm
SiK Radio v2 900 MHz or 433 MHz 500 m 3.3 V -121 dBm 20 dBm
RFD900 900 MHz or 868 MHz >40 km 3.3 to 5 V >121 dBm +30 dBm
Robsense 433 MHz 3-5 km 5 V -148 dBm 20 dBm
Fig. 1: The MAVLink 1.0 Header Structure
0 and incremented in each generated message. The sequence
number of message enabled to detect message losses in the
receiver. The fourth byte SYS represents the System ID. Every
unmanned system should have its System ID, in particular, if
they are managed by one ground station. The System ID 255
is typically allocated for ground stations. One limitation of
MAVLink 1.0 is that it restricts the number of drones managed
by one ground station to 254 because the System ID is encoded
in 1 Byte. The fifth byte is the Component ID, and it identifies
the component of the system that is sending the message.
There are 27 hardware types (i.e., components) in MAVLink
1.0. If there is no subsystem or component, then it is not used.
The sixth byte represents the Message ID (MSGID), which
refers to the type of the message embedded in the payload. For
example, the message ID equal to 0 refers to a message of type
HEARTBEAT, which indicates that the system is alive and is
sent every one second. One more example with a Message
ID equal to 33, which refers to a message that carries out
the GPS coordinate of the unmanned system. The message ID
is the essential information that allows to parse the payload
and extract the information from it, based on the type of
message. Each message contains a specified number of fields
and serialized in binary format in a particular order, according
to the standard specification. The payload is located just after
the message ID and can take a maximum of 255 bytes. Finally,
the last two bytes are for the checksum. The CKA and CKB
represent the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) calculated with
seed values A and B, respectively. The CRC ensures that the
message has not been changed during its transmission and that
both the sender and the receiver have the same message. It is
calculated using the ITU X.25/SAE AS-4 hash of the bytes
of the message, excluding the STX field (the hash is applied
to 6+n+1 bytes, and the extra is the seed value). The seed is
added at the end of the message when computing the CRC.
The minimum message length of MAVLink 1.0 is 8 bytes
for acknowledgment packets without the payload. On the other
hand, the maximum length of a MAVLink 1.0 message is 263
bytes for full payload.
Summary and explanation of each MAVLink 1.0 header
fields are presented in Table II.
2) MAVLink 2.0 Protocol Header: The MAVLink 2.0 pro-
tocol header was released in early 2017 and is the current
recommended version. It is backward compatible with the
MAVLink 1.0 version and includes several improvements over
the MAVLink 1.0 version. We first start with presenting the
MAVLink 2.0 protocol header; then we highlight the main
differences between the two versions. Fig. 2 shows the header
structure of MAVLink 2.0.
The MAVLink 2.0 header shares all the fields with
MAVLink 1.0 header, and adds its new fields, in addition to
the changing the size of some existing fields. The first byte
is the start-of-text marker, and its specific value is 0xFD for
MAVLink 2.0 (as opposed to 0xFE for MAVLink 1.0). Thus,
the parser has to first recognize this character before being able
to parse the remaining fields of the MAVLink 2.0 message.
The payload length is the next field and is the same as in the
legacy protocol. MAVLink introduces two new flags before
the sequence number (SEQ) of the message. The first flags are
Incompatibility flags, which are flags that affect the message
structure. The flags indicate whether the packet contains some
features that must be considered when parsing the packet. For
example, an Incompatibility flag equal to 0x01 means that the
packet is signed and that a signature is appended at the end of
the packet. The second flag is compatibility flags, which does
not affect the structure of the message. It indicates flags that
can be ignored if not understood and it does not prevent the
parser from processing the message even if the flag cannot be
interpreted. For example, this may refer to flags that indicate
the priority of the packet (e.g., High Priority) as it does not
affect the packet structure. The sequence number (SEQ), the
System ID (SYSID) and Component ID (COMPID) are the
same as in the MAVLink 1.0 protocol header. However, the
Message ID (MSGID) is encoded into 24 bits instead of 8
bits in the previous version, which allows a much higher
number of message types in MAVLink 2.0, reaching up to
16777215 possible types. It is not clear what is the reason to
design such a huge space of possible message types, as the
number of possibilities is overly large. The Payload field can
take up to 255 bytes of data, which depends on the message
type. The checksum is similar to its peer in MAVLink 1.0.
Finally, MAVLink 2.0 uses an optional Signature field of 13
bytes to ensure that the link is tamper-proof. This features
significantly improve security aspects of the MAVLink 1.0 as
it allows the authentication of the message and verifies that it
originates from a trusted source. The signature of the message
is appended if the incompatibility flags are set to 0x01.
The 13 bytes of the message signature contain the following
fields:
• LinkID: it is one byte that represents the ID of the link
(channel) used to send the packet. A link or a channel
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TABLE II: Explanation of MAVlink frame acronyms along with its contents.
Acronym Content Description
STX 0XFE It describes start of frame and will always be 0xFE as in official documentation of MAVLink 1.0.
LEN 0 to 255 The value of LEN is described by length of payload.
SEQ 0 to 255 The sequence of packet is shown in this part of message. Such as 0 represent the first message. It is used
for detecting lost MAVlink packets.
SYS 1 to 255 This field represents the ID of the unmanned system.
COMP 0 to 255 This field represents which component in the system is sending the message.
MSG 0 to 255 This field represents the message type.
Payload 0 to 255
bytes
This carries out the real data of the message, which depends on the message type.
CKA and
CKB (CRC)
or checksum
Two
bytes
contents
The CKA and CKB is referred as checksum. The signing of packet happens from Least Significant Bit
(LSB) to Most Significant Bit(MSB).
Fig. 2: MAVLink 2.0 Header
Fig. 3: MAVLink Heartbeat Message
can be WiFi or telemetry and can be combined. Every
channel used to send data should have its own LinkID.
It provides a means for multi-channel unmanned system
control using MAVLink 2.0.
• timestamp: it is encoded with 6 bytes in 10-microsecond
units since 1st January 2015 GMT. It increases for
every message sent over the channel. It is applied
to every stream where a stream is defined by the
tuple (SystemID, ComponentID, LinkID). The
timestamp is used to avoid replay attacks.
• signature: it is encoded in 6 bytes for the message and
is calculated based on the complete message, timestamp,
and the secret key. The signature includes the first 6 bytes
(48 bites) of the SHA-256 hash applied to the MAVLink
2.0 message (excluding the signature, and including the
timestamp). The secret key is a shared symmetric key of
32 bytes stored on both ends, namely the autopilot, and
the ground station or the MAVLink API.
The signature of the MAVLink 2.0 message has conse-
quences on how to process incoming MAVLink messages. If
the message is signed, then it is discarded if (i.) the timestamp
of the received message is older than the previous packet
received from the same stream identified by (SystemID,
ComponentID, LinkID) tuple, (ii.) the computed signa-
ture at the reception is different from the signature appended to
the message. This may infer a data alteration in the message,
(iii.) the timestamp exceeded one minute as compared to the
local system’s timestamp. If the message is not signed, then the
acceptance/rejection of the packet is implementation specific.
D. MAVLink Messages Types
MAVLink defines several types of messages, which are
identified by their Message ID. Messages with Message IDs
lower than 255 are common for both MAVLink 1.0 and
MAVLink 2.0, and those with Message IDs higher than 255
are specific to MAVLink 2.0. As mentioned in the previous
section, the Message ID in MAVLink 1.0 is encoded in only
8 bits and was extended to 24 bits in MAVLink 2.0.
We categorize MAVLink messages into two classes:
• State messages: these messages are sent from the un-
manned system to the ground station and contain informa-
tion about the state of the system, such as its ID, location,
velocity, and altitude.
• Command messages: they are by the ground station (or
user program) to the unmanned system to execute some
actions or missions by the autopilot. For example, the
ground station can send a command to a drone to take
off or to land or to go to a waypoint or even a to execute
a mission with several waypoints.
Considering the large number of MAVLink messages,
the comprehensive description of all these messages is out
of the scope of this paper and can be found in details in
[10]. In what follows, we present the most relevant state
and command messages used in common implementations of
autopilots. More messages are presented in Table IV.
1) State Messages: There are several types of state mes-
sages defined in MAVLink.
HEARTBEAT message: The HEARTBEAT message
is the most important message in MAVLink, and its
structure is depicted in Fig. 3. It indicates that the vehicle
system is present and active. The unmanned system
periodically sends the heartbeat message (in general every
second) to the ground station to inform the GCS that it
is active. The heartbeat is a required message. In addition
to the header, the message payload contains essential
information about the unmanned system. The first field is
the type, which indicates the type of the Micro Aerial
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Vehicle. According to the latest specification in [10],
there are 33 pre-defined types defined in the MAV_TYPE,
including quadrotor (MAV_TYPE_QUADROTOR = 2),
helicopter (MAV_TYPE_HELICOPTER = 4), fixed wing
(MAV_TYPE_FIXED_WING = 1), and several others. The
autopilot field indicates the type of autopilot. There are several
types defined in the MAV_AUTOPILOT enumeration structure.
For example, MAV_AUTOPILOT_GENERIC = 0 indicates
a generic autopilot, MAV_AUTOPILOT_ARDUPILOTMEGA
= 3 indicates ArduPilot autopilot, MAV_AUTOPILOT_PX4
= 12 for PX4 autopilots.
The base_mode field indicates different operation modes.
Understanding the base_mode is crucially important to cor-
rectly parse the heartbeat message and extract useful informa-
tion out of it. It is encoded in 8 bits. There are 8 pre-defined
flags, from 20 to 27. Here are the eight different modes:
• Flag = 1 is reserved for future use
• Flag = 2 means that the test mode is enabled. This
mode is used for temporary tests and not used for regular
flights.
• Flag = 4 means that the autonomous mode (AUTO) is
enabled. This means that the unmanned system is oper-
ating autonomously by navigating to the goal waypoints
sent to it from the ground station. In AUTO mode, a
mission is loaded to the autopilot. A mission consists of
a set of several waypoints that the system has to navigate.
• Flag = 8 means that the GUIDED mode is enabled. In
GUIDED mode, a mission consists of a single waypoint
sent to the system. The system then navigates to the
specified location autonomously.
• Flag = 16 means that the system stabilizes its attitude
(orientation and altitude), and possibly its position, by
automatic control. This requires external sensors like GPS
in an indoor environment, altitude sensors (barometer,
LIDAR) or motion capture for indoor positioning to be
able to hover in a stable state. The system needs external
control inputs to make it move around.
• Flag = 32 means that the hardware in the loop sim-
ulator is activated, i.e., all motors and actuators of the
motors are blocked while the internal autopilot is fully
operational.
• Flag = 64 means that manual mode is enabled, which
requires that the pilot manually control the system using
a remote control input. In manual control, there is no
automatic control made by the autopilot.
• Flag = 128 the system is in armed state, which means
that motors are enabled/running and can start the fly.
The custom mode is also essential. It indicates autopilot
specific flags that are interpreted in addition to the base mode.
It is used in heartbeat message parsing to determine the flight
modes of the autopilot system. There are pre-defined values
for the custom mode including 0 for manual flight mode,
4 for guided mode, 10 for auto mode, 11 for RTL mode,
9 for LAND mode, 2 for ALT HOLD, and 5 for LOITER.
In the next section, we provide a comprehensive overview of
the different flight modes in ArduPilot systems supported by
MAVLink.
The system_status field represents a flag that indicates
the system state. There are night states defined as of the latest
specification [10]:
• system_status = 0 refers to a system that is not
initialized system or an unknown state.
• system_status = 1 indicates that the system is
booting.
• system_status = 2 means that the system is per-
forming a a calibration. In fact, the sensor calibration is a
very important phase to make sure that flight sensors such
as Inertial Measurement Units (IMU), and Compasses are
consistent and run as expected.
• system_status = 3 it means that the system is in
standby mode and can be started at any time.
• system_status = 4 indicates that the motors are
engaged and that the system is active and might be
airborne.
• system_status = 5 indicate potential errors and
that the system is in critical state, although it can still
navigate. This can happen for example during temporary
interference or battery level starting to be low, etc.
• system_status = 6 this means an emergency situa-
tion where the unmanned system lost control over some
parts and is in distress situation. The system may have
already been crashed.
• system_status = 7 indicates that the system has
started its power-off process and is now shutting down.
• system_status = 8 indicates that the system is ter-
minating itself and ending its flight.
Finally, mavlink_version field indicates the MAVLink
version. It is not editable by the user and is set by the protocol.
System Status message: The system status message has
a Message ID equal to 1 and is composed of data about the
onboard control sensors embedded into the unmanned system
and specifies which of these sensors are enabled/disabled and
which sensors are operating or having errors. It also carries out
data about the battery status and the remaining voltage, which
is useful to track the battery level of the unmanned system.
Besides, it provides information about the communication
errors and the ratio of dropped packets in the communication
link. The information about battery and communication link
are crucial to take appropriate failsafe action when the battery
level goes down, or the communication quality deteriorates.
In this case, the unmanned system can be pre-programmed to
execute a failsafe operation in case of low battery level or bad
communication quality such as landing and going back home
for an unmanned aerial system.
Global Position message: The global positioning message
has an id equal to 33 and represents the filtered GPS coordinate
provided by the Global Positioning sensor. It is illustrated in
Fig. 4. This message carries out important information of the
unmanned system related to its global positions, namely, the
GPS latitude (lat), longitude (lon) and also absolute altitude
(alt). These three values are encoded into four bytes (32 bits).
The values of (lat) and (lon) must be divided by 107, to
get the real floating GPS value, it is needed to divide them by
107. The altitude is expressed in millimeters. The message also
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contains a relative altitude field (relative_alt), which
represents the altitude relative to the takeoff ground point of
the unmanned aerial system. It is different from the absolute
altitude. For example, the absolute altitude of Riyadh city
is 612 meters, which corresponds to a relative altitude of 0
meters, as the drone is on the ground. If the drone takes off
at a relative altitude from the ground of 10 meters, then its
absolute altitude becomes 622 meters. Besides, this message
also carries out information about the linear speed of the
unmanned system along the 3 axis ((x,y,z) in addition to
orientation referred to as heading. This information is collected
from the GPS sensor, and it can also be read from other sensors
such as the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) or the compass,
which are available in other MAVLink messages.
Fig. 4: System status message
2) Command Messages: There are several command mes-
sages in MAVLink that give the ability to request the un-
manned system to perform certain actions. In what follows,
we provide an overview of the most important commands.
Table III presents a summary of a selected set of MAVLink
commands.
COMMAND LONG: The COMMAND LONG is a
multi-purpose command that allows sending different types of
commands depending on the command type of the message
and its parameters. The COMMAND LONG message has
a Message ID equal to 76 and is defined with 11 fields,
as illustrated in Fig. 5. The target_system field and
the target_component field specify the system that will
execute the command, and its underlying component.
The command field refers to the type of command to be ex-
ecuted. It is defined in the MAV_CMD command enumerations.
Also, for each command, a set of parameters relevant to the
command can be set. In what follows, we provide a summary
of some commands and their respective parameters.
For example, the command ID with 21 refers to the LAND
command, and it has no parameter. Some other commands
have parameters like the takeoff command (ID=22), which has
to specify the takeoff altitude in param 7, and the command
arm/disarm which specifies a Boolean value in param1 to
indicate whether to arm or disarm the motors. There are around
60 commands types defined in the MAV CMD command enu-
merations. The confirmation field indicates if the message was
sent for the first time with value 0, and other values represent
a confirmation of the message. The 7 parameters depend on
the type of command. For example, for the LAND command,
all seven parameters are useless. In the takeoff command, the
seventh parameter represents the altitude requested for the
takeoff.
The Mission Item Command: The mission item command
has a Message ID equal to 39 and allows to send a waypoint
to an unmanned system so that it navigates autonomously to
that specific waypoint in GUIDED mode. Every mission item
command message has a sequence number that specifies its
TABLE III: Selected List of Important MAVLink Commands
Command Command
ID
Parameters Description
TAKEOFF 22 param7: double this command makes
the aerial unmanned
system takeoff at an
altitude specified in
param1
LAND 21 No parameters this command makes
the aerial unmanned
system land to ground
GET HOME 410 No parameters this command allows
to get the Home posi-
tion, which is the first
waypoint in the mis-
sion list
SET HOME 179
param5: double
param6: double
param7: double
this command allows
to get the Home posi-
tion, which is the first
waypoint in the mis-
sion list
ARM DIS-
ARM
400 param1:
boolean
this command allows
to arm the motors if
param1 is set to true,
and disarm them if
param1 is set to false
target
system
unit8_t
target
component
unit8_t
command
unit16_t
confirmation
unit8_t
param1
float
param2
float
param3
float
param4
float
param5
float
param6
float
param7
float
Fig. 5: Command long
number in the mission, starting from 0, which specifies the
home location. It also has three fields (x,y,z), which spec-
ify the coordinates of the waypoint. However, the coordinate
must be specified with respect to a reference frame. Thus,
the message has a field called frame, which specifies the
reference coordinate frame of the waypoint. This parameter is
important because it is essential to interpret the meaning of the
coordinates (x,y,z). For example, if we set the waypoint
coordinate as (24.68773, 46.72185, 10) with reference to the
global frame MAV FRAME GLOBAL, this would mean to
go to the waypoint at GPS location (24.68773, 46.72185)
and an absolute altitude of 10 meters with respect to sea
level. For example, in Riyadh city (Saudi Arabia), the absolute
altitude is 620 m, so this would be that the drone may go
down and crash to the ground because the target altitude is
lower than that of the ground. However, usually, we want to
specify the location with respect to the ground (e.g., 10 meters
above ground) and for this, we need to specify the reference
frame to be a global frame but with relative altitude namely
MAV FRAME GLOBAL RELATIVE ALT. The command
also specifies the target system and target component as in
other command messages.
E. Flight Modes
Understanding flight modes is crucially important to be
able to pilot a unmanned system running Ardupilot and the
MAVLink protocol. There are several flight modes that were
defined by Ardupilot. In this section, we present the most
important and more common flight modes.
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TABLE IV: Selected List of Important MAVLink Messages
Message
Type
Message Repre-
sentation
Description
0 HEARTBEAT It is the most important message in
MAVLink that tells if the unmanned sys-
tem is alive or not.
1 SYS STATUS It defines the unmanned system state in-
cluding onboard sensors, communication
quality and battery status.
2 SYSTEM TIME It defines the system time of the master
clock that is usually the onboard clock.
5 and 6 CHANGE
OPERATOR
(CONTROL,
ACK)
They represent the request to take control
over the unmanned system and its corre-
sponding acknowledgment
20, 21,
22, 23
PARAM
REQUEST
(READ,
LIST),PARAM
(VALUE ,SET)
These four important messages are related
to on-board parameters whose value can
be obtained by GCS or can be set by GCS.
For example, it is possible to request to
read the SystemID parameter or to change
it.
24,
25, 33,
48, 49,
123,
124,
127
GPS RAW INT,
GPS STATUS,
GLOBAL
POSITION
INT, SET GPS
GLOBAL
ORIGIN ,
GPS GLOBAL
ORIGIN, GPS
INJECT DATA,
GPS2 RAW, GPS
RTK,
These messages are related to the GPS
sensor information, such the raw GPS
value, the Global Position value, etc.
26,27 SCALED IMU
and RAW IMU
These messages contain the scaled and
raw IMU sensor data according to 9
degrees-of-freedom including accelera-
tion, gyro (angular speed) and magnetic
field all in three axes
37 up
to 47
and 51
MISSION related
messages
There are 10 messages defined for mis-
sions request a mission, or set a way-
point in a mission, clearing a mission
(i.e., delete all its waypoints), or getting
acknowledgement for a mission, etc. A
mission is defined as a set of waypoints
sent to the unmanned system to navigate
to them in the autonomous mode.
34, 35,
50, 65,
70, 92
RC CHANNELS
SCALED, RAW,
PARAM MAP
RC, OVERRIDE,
HIL RC INPUTS
RAW
All these messages are for RC control to
get the channels, write data or controls.
75, 76 COMMAND
(INT, LONG,
ACK)
It sends the command to the unmanned
system for performing actions such as (a)
navigation commands (b) do commands
(start, jump etc.) or (3) condition com-
mands, all listed in MAV CMD.
• The STABILIZE mode In this mode, the unmanned
system is fully controlled by the user, position, altitude,
and heading. The unmanned system will respond to every
input from the RC controller controlled by the user, and
it is up to the user to compensate any drift made by the
unmanned system.
It is recommended that users immediately switch to the
STABILIZE mode to manually control the unmanned
system, when the autopilot fails to control the vehicle
in any other autonomous mode.
It has to be noted that it is possible to download dataflash
log files from your unmanned system, to analyze the flight
performance by opening it in mission planner in the graph
tab.
• ALTITUDE HOLD: A more comfortable mode to con-
trol the unmanned system is the ALTITUDE HOLD or
ALT HOLD mode where the user does not have to worry
about maintaining a fixed altitude for the unmanned
system, as the autopilot will take care of controlling
automatically using a PID controller the altitude. The
user will have to take care of controlling the direction
and position of the unmanned system manually.
The ALT HOLD mode automatically controls the altitude
of the unmanned system by the autopilot. However, it
does not control the heading, and position, which are left
to the user. This mode is more recommended for newbies
than the STABILIZE mode and does not require a GPS
because it estimates the altitude with the barometer.
It is possible to tune the setting of the PID controller
of the ALT HOLD mode in APM mission Planner as
illustrated in Fig. 6. The altitude is maintained with
proportional controller that estimate the error between
the desired altitude and the actual altitude and tune
the vertical acceleration proportionally to that error. The
proportional gain can be set through a ground station
as illustrated in Fig. 6. The Proportional gain must be
carefully set because a very high gain will make the
control more aggressive and less stable, whereas a very
low gain will make the control very slow and non-
responsive.
• LOITER: An even more accessible mode to control the
unmanned system is the LOITER mode, which maintains
the current location, orientation, and altitude of the un-
manned system once the user does not provide input to
the RC controller. This mode is similar to the STABILIZE
mode, but the unmanned system will control its position,
heading, and altitude once the user gets his fingers out
of the RC sticks. The LOITER mode requires a GPS 3D
fix to work with, or optical flow.
It has to be noted that it is not possible to arm the vehicle
in LOITER mode only if (1) GPS has 3D Lock, (2)
HDOP is smaller than 2.0. As such, this mode requires a
GPS 3D fix to work with.
To achieve excellent LOITER performance, it is essential
to have (1) GPS Lock, (2) low magnetic interference of
the compass, and (3) low vibration.
The PID controller gains can be tuned from the Mission
Planner ground station or similar ground stations.
The LOITER SPEED represents the max horizontal speed
in cm/s and is typically equal to 500 cm/s (which is
equivalent to 5m/s). The default configuration is that the
maximum acceleration is equal to the half of the LOITER
SPEED (i.e., 2.5m/s2).
The parameters of the LOITER mode can be configured
through a ground station as illustrated in Fig.6 by setting
PID control gains of the altitude, position and orientation
(Yaw, Pitch and Roll).
• LAND: The LAND mode will force the unmanned sys-
tem to land to the ground.
• RTL: The RTL mode, also called Return to Launch, will
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 8A T HOLD Tuning
Fig. 6: Settings of the PID controller
force the unmanned system to return to start position
where it performed the TAKEOFF.
LAND and RTL mode are used in case of violation of
navigation safety and geofence, for example, it is possible
to program on the autopilot that if the battery goes under
a certain level, then the unmanned system needs to LAND
immediately or return to start position automatically. This
is called GEOFENCE.
• GUIDE: The GUIDED mode is essential and operates
only with GPS mode. When the GPS of the unmanned
system performs 3D fix and is activated, then the un-
manned system can be sent to navigate autonomously to
a particular GPS coordinate through the ground station. It
is called GUIDED mode because the unmanned system is
guided by the user to navigate autonomously to a specific
waypoint chosen by the user.
The GUIDED mode is used in conjunction with GPS
and allows the user to send the unmanned system to
specified waypoint defined by their GPS coordinates. It
is not possible to arm the unmanned system in GUIDED
mode only when the GPS has the 3D fix.
In GUIDED mode usually, a ground station is used to
send a navigation waypoint to the unmanned system to
navigate to it. It is therefore important to have a telemetry
device connected to the unmanned system and the ground
station to allow long-range communication between them.
Typically, a user needs to click on a point on the map, in
GUIDED mode and the unmanned system will plan its
path and move towards the goal.
• AUTO: The AUTO mode refers to the autonomous mode,
where the unmanned system will follow a predefined
mission. A Mission is a set of waypoints stored in the
unmanned system autopilot. When the AUTO mode is
selected, the unmanned system will autonomously go to
each waypoint in the same order as they are stored.
III. SECURITY ISSUES OF MAVLINK
A. MAVLink Security Requirements
Many research works dealt with the security of unmanned
systems but much less addressed MAVLink security issues.
Among them, several works tackled the security requirements
that must be taken into account in the MAVLink protocol. In
what follows, we summarize the most important requirements
in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentica-
tion, non-repudiation, authorization, and privacy in order to
secure MAVLink communications.
• Confidentiality: It is an essential requirement to guar-
antee private data exchange between entities. It protects
against attacks pertaining to non authorized disclosure
of secret information exchanged in the network between
the unmanned system and the ground station, since an
adversary might be able to intercept commands sent from
GCS to the unmanned system, or steal other system state
data transmitted from the GCS to the unmanned system.
• Integrity: It is mandatory to secure communications
between GCSs and UAVs by ensuring the integrity of ex-
changed data. Integrity is required to ensure that telemetry
information sent from the unmanned systems and control
signals sent from the GCS have not been intention-
ally or unintentionally interrupted, altered or modified.
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It protects against threats that pertain to unauthorized
information modification.
• Availability: The communication between UAVs and
GCSs should be available, as well as the information itself
is always available when needed or requested, even if a
fault has occurred on the UAV system or an attacker tries
to jam the UAV/GCS channel.
It is fundamental that all the elements of the UAV system
are operating and performing their requested functions
and expected services when needed. Considering system
maintenance, it is mandatory to ensure the continuous
operation of the service without interruption, and to
guarantee that the system performance is maintained so
that the system keeps its availability uninterrupted during
operation. Besides, for the accessibility to the UAV, the
service must be available when the user needs it.
• Authentication: In a network of unmanned systems,
multiple entities are participating and exchanging infor-
mation in the network. Authenticating these entities and
information origins is mandatory. Authentication allows
each node to verify the origin of the data transmitted, i.e.,
make sure that the message is effectively received from
an authentic source. The authentication of the unmanned
system by the GCS is highly critical to make sure the
GCS is controlling an authorized drone, not a fake one.
Also, it is essential that GCS can also be authenticated so
that an unmanned system does not send its state or accept
commands from a hacked/fake ground station. Therefore,
it is mandatory to authenticate both ends to ensure that
data sources are trustworthy.
• Non-repudiation: Any entity in UAV network does not
deny that it has sent or received data or control com-
mands.
• Authorization: It refers to the ability of a system to
permit access to information, and which actions these
entities are allowed to perform. In the case of MAVLink
only authorized GCSs and UAVs, can enter the network,
are permitted to exchange telemetry data and send control
command.
• Privacy: Exchanged information between GCSs and
UAVs includes sensitive information about location, bat-
tery status, speed, weather, wind speed, mission sta-
tus, etc. This private information must not be leaked
to unauthorized third parties. Thus, it is mandatory to
preserve the privacy of communications, hide UAVs and
GCSs’ identities and protect sensitive information issued
by UAVs and GCSs from intruders.
B. MAVLink Security Threats
Communication between UAVs and GCS is established by a
communication protocol via a wireless channel, which makes
them vulnerable to various attacks since the communication
protocol MAVLink does not support security procedures. Both
confidentiality and authentication mechanisms are not natively
supported. The GCS exchange data with UAVs through an
unauthenticated channel and without encryption. These con-
nections can be easily hacked, someone with an appropriate
transmitter can communicate with the drone, inject commands
into an existing session and easily launch attacks on UAVs.
The open nature of communications makes MAVLink
vulnerable against various malicious attacks. These attacks
can be classified as Interception (Attacks that compromise
data confidentiality), Modification (Attacks that compromise
data integrity), Interruption (Attacks that compromise data
availability) and Fabrication (Attacks on authenticity). In the
following, we detail further these threats:
1) Confidentiality and privacy attacks: In this category of
attacks, an intruder gets an unauthorized access to confidential
and sensitive information by intercepting data, commands
or messages exchanged between UAV and GCS. The con-
fidentiality and privacy of the information are affected in
this category of attack. Such attacks concern eavesdropping,
identity spoofing traffic analysis and unauthorized access and
are a result of deficiencies in the security of MAVLink.
• Eavesdropping (Communication capture): Due to the
lack of encrypted connections, an attacker listens to
the communication happening between UAVs and GCS,
eavesdrops on the information exchanged between UAVs
and GCS directly from the open environment. This kind
of attacks is exploited by the adversary to obtain infor-
mation about the UAV, and consequently perform more
elaborated attacks (active attacks). The attacker captures
control data and commands sent from the GCS to the
UAV, to be used in a replay or a fabrication attack.
Telemetry data broadcasted from UAVs to the GCS is
intercepted by an adversary to gain knowledge about
the UAVs location and flying speed. Eavesdropping is
a passive attack that breaches the confidentiality and
privacy of the control signal and telemetry data. The lack
of data encryption and authentication in communication
stimulates such attacks.
• Identity spoofing: The MAVLink Communication pro-
tocol is unencrypted and uses the System IDs to identify
the drone which sends or is expected to receive the mes-
sages. System ID is sent in clear within the unencrypted
MAVLink header. Thus, an attacker can compromise the
communication link to get the identity of the sending
system.
• Traffic analysis: Traffic analysis is a passive attack. An
intruder may collect exchanged data to infer specific
data to reveal specific patterns about the communication
between UAV and GCS. It can be any useful information
such as frequency of MAVLink communication, size of
MAVLink packets, etc. Traffic analysis is a method to
gather useful and sensitive information that potentially
can be used in other attacks.
• Unauthorized access: It occurs when the attacker gets
access to the UAV and/or GCS, their services and re-
sources using duplicated SYSID or COMPID. This attack
usually results in unauthorized disclosure of GCS and
telemetry information from UAV.
2) Integrity attacks: The integrity of MAVLink can be
compromised by modifying the data being sent. Violation of
the MAVLink integrity allows the following attacks:
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• Man-in-the-middle: In the MAVLink communication
protocol, messages are sent in plain text, which represents
vulnerability and a threat to network security. The M-I-T-
M attack can be successfully established in the channel.
The attacker is located between UAVs and GCS and listen
to the exchanged communications. The attacker can infer
the content of the intercepted MAVLink payload and
reconstruct commands. He can replay previously recorded
packets, modify control and telemetry data and send
these wrong data back to the GCS or the UAV. Thus,
the integrity of the control data and telemetry data is
hampered.
• Hijacking (Unauthorized Command Injection): There
is a possibility, whenever a M-I-T-M attack against a UAV
is successful, the attacker sends unauthorized commands
to the UAV to takes its control from its GCS while
allowing the GCS to believe that it is still controlling
the UAV. Once the drone is under his control, the at-
tacker can catch and withhold the UAV. There are two
ways to hijack a drone using MAVLink vulnerabilities:
(i.)(Skyjacking): Exploiting MAVLink’s lack of au-
thentication, a drone called Skyjack hacks other drones by
using airplay-ng software to force disconnecting the au-
thentic user from the drone by injecting de-authentication
messages. Since the drone does not authenticate users, an
hacker may easily connect to it and take control over the
device as soon as the WIFI connection is established.
(ii.)(Radio Jacking): It is another way to hack a
UAV using the MAVLink’s vulnerability. To control the
drone using telemetry via MAVLink, it is mandatory
to set up the NetID to connect to the drone. If an
intruder recognizes the NetID field, he can easily hijack
the UAV through the use of an antenna with the sniffed
NetID to transmit malicious MAVLink packets and false
information.
• Replay attack: Due to the ease of message capture and
open nature of communications, the MAVLink protocol
is vulnerable to replay attacks. A malicious user records
the control data sent to the drone and replays them later
to misuse the drone and produces an unauthorized effect.
This attack may cause loss of control over the drone and
possible crash.
• Message modification: Modification of messages means
altering the contents of the data packet. The attacker
captures the control data sent by the GCS, modifies them
and sends wrong data back to the UAV. As a result,
the GCS’s control data are misinterpreted by the drone
resulting in the drone being uncontrollable. The integrity
of the control data and telemetry data is compromised.
• False location update: An attacker can send spoofed
messages to the GCS using the data link that seems to be
from a UAV containing false UAV location data using
Scapy (a packet manipulation tool) to spoof heartbeat
messages. This attack makes GCS believing that the UAV
is in another location, or is following a wrong trajectory.
3) Availability attacks: Attacks that compromise the avail-
ability of MAVLink can be achieved through interruption of
the link used to exchange data between the drone and the
ground station. There are several means on how to perform
this attack, in particular through jamming, deletion attack,
falsifying signals and Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) attacks.
• Jamming: This attack affects system availability. An
attacker who is trying to take full control of the drone
interrupts the UAV reception of the GCS control signals
by breaking the communication link. The jamming attack
results in the loss of communication between UAVs and
the GCSs through the loss of control signals, which leads
the drone to enter into a lost-link state preventing the
controller from operating correctly, and thereby causing
unavailability of services.
• Denial of service (DoS): An attacker may use the
MAVLink vulnerability to flood the UAVs GCS com-
munication channels with data; the network becomes
interrupted, which leads to resource (UAV and GCS)
unavailability. This form of attack is called a DoS attack.
In such an attack, the control messages as well as the
mission data is not properly received by the drone. As
a result, the drone cannot remain in a stable state, and
the mission is not executed appropriately. If DoS attack
is successful, it can result in a (M-I-T-M) attack. By con-
ducting a MITM attack, the attacker sends unauthorized
commands in an infinite loop to the UAV. This could
effectively deny the communication between the GCS
and the UAV, preventing the legitimate commands sent
by the GCS from being treated by the UAV, as the drone
would always be occupied by commands issued from the
attacker. A successful DoS attack against the drone makes
it no longer responsive to the GCS, or vice versa, because
of the violation of system availability.
Furthermore, in DDoS attack, an adversary sends a huge
number of packets to the UAV or the GCS which causes
a network congestion and prevents the UAV and the GCS
from communicating with each other (failing to respond
to commands).
• Flooding: This attack works on the principle of flooding
the network with a huge number of various packets to
make it down. Generally, packets of types SYN, UDP,
ICMP and Ping are used in this kind of attacks. In [11],
a simulated attack, ICMP flooding attack, was performed
to exploit the vulnerability of the MAVLink waypoint
protocol. The intruder sends many ICMP request packets
to both the GCS and the UAV during their mission. The
GCS and the UAV are too overloaded, and thus, cannot
respond to commands. As such, the UAV sensor values,
the GCS mission commands were not appropriately trans-
mitted. Furthermore, the heartbeat message necessary for
maintaining the connection between the UAV and the
GCS is received after the target time because of the ICMP
flooding attack. In this case, the UAV crashed without
operating the fail-safe mode due to an error in the fail-
safe mode.
4) Authenticity attacks: Authenticity attacks try to make the
GCS/UAV believe that falsified data is authentic. Authenticity
of a MAVLink message can be hampered by fabricating ma-
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licious data to replace the legitimate data. Fabrication attacks
include data fabrication and GCS spoofing.
• Data fabrication: To perform a fabrication attack, the
adversary needs to have extended knowledge about how
the GCS and the considered drone communicate, i.e.,
knows the protocol used by the drone and the GCS, which
can be achieved by having performed eavesdropping and
traffic analysis attacks. This attack violates the integrity
of the control data and/or telemetry data, and can lead to
a hostile takeover of the drone.
• GCS spoofing: The UAV connects with the GCS via
wireless links for data and control signal exchanges.
However, since the wireless environment is open, an
attacker could successfully spoof MAVLink commands.
More specifically, a malicious attacker can send a false
wireless control command to take over the UAV illegiti-
mately.
Fig. 7 summarizes the potential security threats against the
MAVLink protocol, the identified attacks, and the correspond-
ing violated security properties.
IV. MAVLINK SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Despite the widespread use of the MAVLink protocol, it
has security gaps and is prone to several attacks that result
in critical threats and safety concerns. The protocol does
not implement encryption and authentication mechanisms.
Therefore, MAVLink is very prone to security threats and
attacks.
Several techniques and solutions have been already pro-
posed to address the security issues described previously. In
this section, we provide an overview and a classification of
the proposed solutions for each security service as illustrated
in Table. V. Existing security solutions proposed for securing
the MAVLink communication protocol can be classified into
hardware and software approaches.
A. Hardware-based solution
Several embedded and hardware security solutions have
been introduced to secure the MAVLink protocol. In [12], a
lightweight hardware-based solution is proposed to secure the
communication between the GCS and the drone. An FPGA
module connected to the drone embeds the symmetric key
cryptography function: AES-CBC-MAC was used to encrypt
and authenticate both commands and payload data communi-
cated between the drone and the GCS. However, the hardware
solution negatively affects system performance and power con-
sumption due to the extra hardware weight. In [13], the authors
proposed the idea of an additional encrypted communication
channel to improve UAV data security through Raspberry Pi.
This channel was designed to resume the control of the UAV if
any attack was detected on the drone. However, this hardware
solution induces delays between the GCS and the Raspberry
Pi and increases the CPU usage on the Raspberry Pi.
B. Software based solution
We may here further distinguish among several approaches:
the classical security approaches, the Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) based approaches, and the new emerging
Blockchain technology based approaches.
1) Classical security approaches: This category of so-
lutions groups cryptographic-based approaches used in the
context of MAVLink to address the main security services.
We review the proposed cryptographic solutions and discuss
their main advantages and shortages relatively to each security
service.
a) Confidentiality solutions: To ensure confidentiality of
both control signals and telemetry data, MAVLink data has to
be encrypted before being sent. However, it is important to use
both a strong key and a powerful cryptographic algorithm to
mitigate the vulnerabilities of the MAVLink protocol in terms
of confidentiality. Cryptographic algorithms are classified into
two main classes: symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
solutions.
(i.)
Each entity in the system shares the same cryptographic
keys with all other entities. The main benefits of symmetric
key schemes are their easy implementation, fast design, and
low computation requirements. In fact, they use the same key
to encrypt and decrypt data, which makes it appropriate for
limited-resource drones.
In [14], the authors introduced SMACCMPilot, a secure
UAV project based on the MAVLink protocol. SMACCMPilot
refers to GIDL as the application level protocol. GIDL uses
AES to encrypt the MAVLink payload, header, and CRC. The
community of the MAVLink protocol developers are currently
discussing a secure version of MAVLink (sMAVLink) [15].
sMAVLink has the same encryption algorithm as GIDL but
encrypts only the payload, which makes the MAVLink packet
structure untouched. To the best of our knowledge, sMAVLink
has not yet been implemented.
In [16], the authors proposed an encrypted radio control
link based on Galois Embedded Crypto library with the
openLRSng open-source radio project for securing communi-
cation links among open source UAV systems. The proposed
solution uses the symmetric key produced by a trusted third-
party entity and manually hard-coded in the autopilot. This
approach is not efficient and may lead to security vulnera-
bilities and restricts its feasibility. In [17], the authors chose
AES-ECB and AES-CBC to protect command messages.
In [26], the authors proposed a transfer protocol, which pro-
vides confidentiality service and data transfer service between
the drone and GCS. User data are encrypted with a key, derived
during the initialization phase to guarantee data confidentiality,
The work in [18] presented four suitable cryptographic
implementations that may be able to mitigate the confiden-
tiality vulnerabilities presented in the MAVLink protocol using
strong symmetric-key encryption algorithms. The proposed al-
gorithms are Rabbit stream cipher, XXTEA stream cipher, and
Salsa20 stream cipher. They both encrypt MAVLink messages
rapidly while preserving the confidentiality of communication
among the GCS and UAV.
Subsequently, an encryption mechanism RC5 is used in
[19] to secure the MAVLink communication protocol. In [20],
[21], the Caesar cipher cryptography algorithm is used for
data encryption of MAVLink messages between the ground
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Fig. 7: Security threats and attacks against MAVLink Protocol
station and the Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAV). However, in
this method, the secret key is sent as a plain text to the
drone, during the establishment phase. The key could easily be
detected which breaks the whole security system. Moreover,
the Cesar encryption algorithm used in this method is proved
to be insecure and is vulnerable to cryptanalysis.
(ii.)
Another form of encryption is public-private key cryp-
tography, also known as asymmetric encryption. It uses a
couple of public/private keys. The public key is used for
data or information encryption, and the private key, only
known to the receiver, is used for the decryption process. The
advantages of these approaches are their flexibility, scalability
and skey management efficiency. However, these solutions can
cause severe computational, memory, and energy overhead
which are not suitable for constrained devices. RSA and ECC
algorithms were used in [17] to encrypt of Aerial Robotics
Communication.
(iii.)
The problem of public key cryptography resides in its
dependency on the third-party authority that issues the certifi-
cates. To overcome the scalability and complexity issues, IBE
is proposed by suggesting the idea to use known information
that uniquely identifies users (e.g., phone number, email, etc.)
as their public keys for data encryption and thus eliminates
the necessity for certificates and Public Key Infrastructures
(PKI). Despite the clear achievement in scalability and effi-
ciency, IBE needed further refinements to become lightweight
and consequently viable for the use in resources constrained
devices such as UAVs.
The contribution in [22] is twofold. First, a hierarchical
architecture has been designed for the UAV networks us-
ing identity-based encryption and bilinear pairing over el-
liptic curve cryptography (ECC) without compromising sys-
tem security. Second, a lightweight cryptographic primitive
is proposed using a probabilistic selective data encryption
technique. The proposed method improves system perfor-
mance and increases the efficiency of the transmitted message
without affecting security. Stenography or data watermarking
technique is used to reduce overheads and increase message
confidentiality. In [23], a lightweight IBE scheme (IBE-Lite) is
specially designed for resource-constrained IoD architecture.
The proposed scheme facilitates the secure sharing of drones’
data.
e) Integrity solutions: Integrity can be ensured using
signature, hash functions, message authentication code (MAC)
and authenticated encryption cryptographic primitives [43],
[44].
In [24], the authors proposed to add a digital signature to
the data packet using the UAV private key.
According to [25], the authors proposed to use authenticated
encryption cryptographic mechanisms to enforce the integrity
of the data.
In [18], the authors addressed two cryptographic implemen-
tations that can mitigate integrity vulnerabilities presented in
the MAVLink protocol: the Poly1305 Message Authentication
Code (MAC) and the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). The GCM
implementation adds an authentication code along with the
ciphertext and the initialization vector. The authentication code
is used to create an authentication tag that is used as a method
for validating the message integrity. Poly1305 is a message
authentication code (MAC) used to verify data integrity.
However, using Poly1305 or GCM increases the packet size
due to the added padding, which increases the latency in UAV
communications and reduces the energy efficiency of the au-
topilot processor. Moreover, Galois/Counter Mode is the most
computation-extensive mechanism because it authenticates and
encrypts every message using a slower method.
In [26], the authors proposed a data transfer and confi-
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 13
TABLE V: Survey on the state-of-the-art on existing security solutions
Category Key method Proposed solution Research focus REF
Hardware based solution AES-CBC-MAC embedded in FPGA module Hardware
Confidentiality and
authentication [12]
Additional encrypted channel through Raspberry Pi Resume the control of UAV ifany attack was detected [13]
Classical security approaches
AES
Symmetric key
Confidentiality
[14], [15]
Galois Embedded Crypto Library [16]
AES-ECB, AES-CBC [17]
Rabbit stream cipher, XXTEA
stream cipher, and Salsa20 stream cipher [18]
RC5 [19]
Caesar cipher [20], [21]
RSA and ECC Asymmetric key [17]
probabilistic selective data
encryption Identity-based encryption(IBE)
[22]
(IBE-Lite) [23]
Private key Digital signature
Integrity
[24]
Authenticated encryption
algorithm Symmetric key
[25]
Message Authentication Code( Poly1305)
and authenticated encryption algorithm
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
[18]
Message Authentication Code
(MAC) [26]
Strong authentication based
solution Symmetric key Availability [12], [27]
AES-GCM
Symmetric key
Authenticity
[18], [28]
Caesar Cipher [20], [21]
Message Authentication Code
(MAC) [12]
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Asymmetric key [17]
The signature represents the first 48
bits of an SHA-256 hash of the
secret key, header, payload,
CRC, link ID, and timestamp
Digital signature [8]
Intrusion Detection System
(IDS)
Behavior rule-based solution Rule-based specification
detection
Detect and guard a UAV system
against cyber-attacks [29]
Behavior rule-based solution Evaluate the behavior ofattacks that target UAV [30]
UAV behavior based fight
commands Signature-based detection Authentication [31]
Statistical method (recursive least squares
technique) Anomaly-based detection
UAV real-time monitoring
system [32]
Belief-based threat estimation Protect UAVs from attackstargeting data integrity [33]
Neural network and fuzzy learning algorithm Protect UAVs against a distributeddenial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [34]
Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm Detect cyber-attacks thattarget autonomous avionic systems [35]
Bayesian game model Protect UAV-aided networkagainst lethal attackers [36]
Rule-based detection and
SVM-based anomaly detection Hybrid-based detection Identify cyber-attacks [37]
Signature-based anomaly detectors and
residual-based anomaly detectors.
Bayesian network to estimate possible attacks
Detects GPS spoofing attacks [38]
New emerging security
solutions Blockchain Blockchain
Data integrity,
trusted source ,
accountability, and
resilient backend
[39]
Secure the communication
among UAVs [40]
Securely relay drone
information [41]
Security and privacy [42]
dentiality services between the ground station and the drone.
This protocol ensures the message integrity using a message
authentication code (MAC) function using an alternative key
computed based on the master key.
f) Availability solutions: Protecting the UAV against
malicious availability attacks is important to succeed in UAV
missions.
The contribution in [33] consists of proposing an estimation
model based on estimated beliefs to detect the existence of a
system threat. This work includes specific detection policies
to maintain the availability of UAV network.
Authors in [12], [27] surveyed the potential DoS attacks
that could cause serious availability issues in UAV systems.
They also proposed strong authentication based solutions to
mitigate these attacks.
g) Authenticity solutions: Authentication is essential to
make sure that the GCS is controlling an authorized drone not
a fake one, and that the UAV is sending its state or accepting
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commands from a legitimate GCS not from a hacked/fake
ground station. In other words, authentication enables the
UAV and the GCS to guarantee that they communicate with
each other. Authentication techniques used in UAV networks
are Symmetric key solutions, Asymmetric key solutions, and
Digital signature.
(i.)
A symmetric encryption algorithm AES-GCM is used in
[18], [28] to ensure the authenticity of the transmitted signals.
In [20], [21], the authors tackled the problem of authentication
using the Caesar Cipher method in the MAVLink protocol.
To guarantee a secured communication between the UAV
and the GCS, the drone is authenticated at the beginning of
the communication using Cesar Ciphering. Thus, GCS data
will not be received by the UAV unless it gets authenticated,
through sending an encrypted text similar to the one produced
by the GCS.
The Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is used
to provide message authentication by using a symmetric key
encryption technique. Authors in [12] claimed that attaching
the MAC to each MAVLink payload could be suitable to verify
the authenticity of the message.
(ii.)
The authors in [17] employed the use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) for ensuring authentication between the
GCS and the UAV. All feedback messages are encrypted with
the drone’s private key, which means that only the drone’s
public key can decrypt these messages. This procedure ensures
that the receiver authenticates the origin of the received
messages. On the other hand, the GCS’s public/private keys
guarantee that the UAV recognizes the message sent by the
GCS so that the drone is authenticated.
(iii.)
As we stated before, a MAVLink version 2.0 has been
designed to support the packet signing mechanism and to
bring security to MAVLink communications [8]. The signature
represents the first forty eight bits of an SHA-256 hash of the
secret key, payload, link ID, header, CRC, and timestamp. The
13 bytes (including signature, link ID and timestamp) must be
appended at the tail of a MAVLink 2.0 message to ensure that
messages are sent by trusted sources.
Despite packet signing has backward-compatibility and best
portability as compared to other security alternatives, develop-
ers still need to upgrade their autopilots to MAVLink v2.0 to
support packet signing [45].
However, adding packet signing security solution is not free.
The cost consists in several factors including the computa-
tional overhead of 26 microseconds per packet, the increase
of firmware size (packet signing code is 812 bytes) and
the increase in power consumption due to the higher CPU
and network traffic usages. This leads also to increase the
communication time [45].
2) Intrusion Detection System (IDS): It is essential to
protect the UAV system against attackers by allowing to
detect possible cyber attacks against the drone communica-
tion system. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are typically
deployed to monitor the incoming communication, supervise
and identify indications of abnormal activity or behavior.
Some works in [29]–[38] have discussed the area of intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) for UAVs. In what follows, we survey
these existing studies based on the categories of the techniques
proposed for intrusion detection including, the rule-based
specification detection, anomaly-based detection, hybrid-based
detection, and signature-based detection,.
a) Rule-based specification detection: This method is
based on comparing the behavior of UAVs against a set of
specified rules based on the expected behaviors of UAVs.
In [29], Mitchell and Chen proposed the BRUIDS intrusion
detection mechanism, which aims to detect and protect a
UAV system against security threats. BRUIDS is a rule-based
specification detection technique for intrusion detection of
compromised UAVs. The authors proposed a set of behavioral
rules related to cyber-attacks constructed based on defined
attack models to build a model of a normal UAV behavior.
Kim et al. [30] evaluated the behavior of attacks that target
UAV. They proposed a behavior rule-based intrusion detection
system for UAVs, in which the rules are specified according to
these malicious anomalies to model a normal UAV behavior.
b) Signature-based detection: This method refers to
the detection of known attacks based on predefined known
signatures, features, and patterns. Such signatures are used
to compare patterns with captured events to recognize and
ensure the detection of possible intrusions. Although signature-
based detection can easily detect known attacks, it is difficult
to detect unknown or new attacks for which no pattern is
available.
Authors in [31] proposed a technique (behaviometrics) for
continuous authentication of data command transmitted by
a ground station to the drone based on UAV behavior. The
drone’s behavior is specified using a set of flight commands,
which are considered later as a unique signature to identify
authorized UAVs and detect malicious commands stemmed
from attackers.
c) Anomaly-based detection: Anomaly-based mecha-
nism defines normal and baseline features to build a model
of normal behavior profile and to follow any possible vari-
ation from the normal behavior. Anomaly detection usually
uses statistic analysis, machine learning techniques, and game
theory to enhance the detection of anomaly behavior of a
monitored node and unknown attacks. The key benefit of this
mechanism lies in its ability to detect new or unknown attacks
when there are no predefined signatures of the unknown
attacks.
Authors in [32] presented another IDS, where they pro-
posed a prototype of UAV real-time monitoring system to
control avionics and flight controller systems. Their approach
adapts the recursive least squares technique to estimate UAV
navigation sensor, controller parameters, and other related
parameters. Through the application of this statistical method,
the IDS can identify the system’s parameters values, and
the anomaly is detected whenever the monitored parameters
deviate from their expected values during the flight.
In [34], the authors suggested an intrusion detection system
based on Neural network and fuzzy learning algorithms to
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protect UAVs against a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks.
Authors in [35] developed an anomaly detection scheme
based on Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm to detect
cyber-attacks that target autonomous avionic systems.
The authors in [33] proposed and implemented an intrusion
detection system to protect UAVs from attacks targeting data
integrity. The detection of these attacks relies on a belief-
based threat estimation model to reduce false positive and false
negative rates.
Besides, the authors in [36] proposed a collaborative intru-
sion detection framework, named Security Game Framework
(SGF), to protect UAV-aided network against lethal attackers.
SGF is formulated based on the Bayesian game model to detect
attacks accurately.
d) Hybrid-based detection: It takes the advantages of
both rule-based, anomaly detection, and signature-based and
combines them to catch known and/or unknown attack signa-
tures and abnormal events.
In [37], authors investigated the use of an intrusion detec-
tion. The IDS uses an SVM learning algorithm to classify
threats while monitoring the behavior of UAVs. A sequence
of detection policies related to each cyber-attack is proposed
based on a hybrid approach (rule-based detection and SVM-
based anomaly detection) to model a normal UAV behavior.
The authors in [38] proposed a framework based on IDS
that detects GPS spoofing attacks onboard the UAV. The IDS
uses the attack-signature-based anomaly detectors as well as
residual-based anomaly detectors. The Bayesian network takes
anomaly detectors outputs as evidence to estimate a possible
attack through Bayesian inference.
3) New emerging security solutions: Blockchain is an
emergent technology that can be efficiently used solve the
aforementioned security issues of MAVLink. Blockchain is
originally used for recording financial transactions between en-
tities in a distributed and decentralized manner. The transaction
is verified collaboratively using trusted entities in the network,
thus eliminating the need for a controlling authority. Moreover,
transactions are stored on the Blockchain, which makes tam-
pering with data extremely challenging because Blockchain
relies on fully distributed cryptographic techniques. In this
way, any modification on these transactions can be easily
detected.
All these advantages led several researchers to consider
this technology to deal with security issues in UAV network
since Blockchain provides privacy, integrity, accountability,
authorization, authentication, confidentiality, identity hiding
and non-repudiation.
In [39], the authors included Blockchain and cloud storage
in their framework to guarantee the UAV data integrity. This
idea addresses the following objectives: trusted source, timing,
and data integrity, accountability and resilient backend.
In [40], Blockchain is used to secure the communication
among UAVs as they collaborate to make cooperative deci-
sions and exchange data.
Sharma et al. [41] exploited the Blockchain features to
securely relay drone information, especially in ultra-dense
environments.
Furthermore, authors in [42] presented a system model
based on the public Blockchain technology which provides
security and privacy to the IoD network.
The approach proposed by [46] relies on Blockchain prin-
ciples to identify compromised UAVs using trust rules and
detect wrong information when a UAV is hijacked.
V. LITERATURE REVIEW
The MAVLink protocol has attracted the research commu-
nity, and several contributions were proposed in the litera-
ture. Some of these works proposed some extensions and
enhancements to the protocol (e.g., [47], [48], and [49]), while
some other works presented the integration of the MAVLink
protocol with the cloud and the Internet of Things (e.g., [50],
[51]). Furthermore, recent works also addressed how to use
MAVLink for autonomous agents and swarms (e.g. [52], [53],
[52]). In this section, we present an overview of the recent
research contributions that dealt with the MAVLink protocol.
A. Extensions and enhancements
Recently, several research studies proposed extensions to
the MAVLink protocol. In particular, the authors in [47], [48],
and [49] extended the MAVLink protocol to support the multi-
drones’ cooperation.
In [47], the authors defined a new set of messages and
data structures to manage a swarm and to enable drone-to-
drone communication. The proposed messages are divided
into two groups: swarm formation set and swarm maintenance
set. In total, the authors developed six enumerations, six
new commands, and thirty-three new messages. However,
the authors did not validate their approach neither with a
simulation nor experimental implementation. The concept of
groups was introduced into the MAVLink protocol by adding
two identifiers: 1) Group ID (group-wide), and 2) Group
Member ID (group-internal). For the swarm maintenance, two
factors were considered: drone replacement and recharging.
The drone replacement is the process of finding a suitable
alternative drone, then move all the mission-related data to that
new drone, and finally the physical and logical replacement of
the old drone with the new drone to finish the mission. The
drone replacement is needed in several cases such as when
the flight duration is undefined or longer than the capacity
of the battery, or when the drone encounters some hardware
problems. The recharge is a specific operation to extend the
mission duration because of the limited battery capacity.
In [49], Erdelj et al. also proposed additional new
MAVLink messages and commands support collaboration be-
tween drones in multi-UAV scenarios. The paper proposed
an approach to ensure the continuity of the drone service,
which means that when a drone has to leave the mission, it is
immediately replaced with another. A proof-of-concept simu-
lation was presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm. Also, the authors analyzed the performance of their
system in terms of the total number of bytes induced by the
collaboration.
The work in [54], presented a system that trans-
lates MAVLink messages to STANAG 4586 standard [55].
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STANAG 4586 is a complete standard aiming at having NATO
interoperability between UAVs from different countries. A
bridge between MAVLink and STANAG 4586 created in a
Raspberry Pi computer to make it easy to integrate with any
UAV (Fig. 8). This work aimed to allow any GCS compatible
with STANAG 4586 to be able to operate with any MAVLink-
based UAV to accomplish the interoperability between the
UAVs of the NATO’s member. The proposed system was
tested using the SITL simulator. Only important messages
were translated such as waypoints messages because STANAG
4586 has a large set of messages. The messages were received
successfully by the UAV, and the change on the parameters
(long, lat, and alt) was not significant.
Fig. 8: Bridge between MAVLink and STANAG 4586 [54]
B. Cloud and IoT Integration
The use of Internet-of-Things to communicate, manage and
control multiple drones has gained a lot of interest.
In [51], the authors proposed Dronemap Planner, which
is a cloud-based system to manage drones over the Internet
and to offload heavy computation from the UAV to the cloud
(e.g., Image Processing). The authors used the MAVLink
protocol to send information from the drone to the cloud. The
cloud forwards UAV data to corresponding users, which also
send their commands to the drones through the cloud. The
paper provided a complete implementation of the cloud-based
management system and demonstrated how to monitor and
control drones over the Internet effectively.
The work in [50] proposed a multi-UAV system for tracking
and scanning missions in disaster response applications. A
UAV is turned into an IoT device by embedding an 4G
dongle with the drone autopilot. The MAVLink protocol is
used for the communication between the UAV and the GCS.
The authors proposed to use APM software on Windows 2016
OS running on a cloud server (Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)).
Experiments on a scanning mission for an area of size 0.16 km
with real drones were conducted on a university campus. The
missions were executed on EC2 and MAVLink through UDP
and TCP protocols to exchange data and receive commands
from the ground station. In addition, this paper analyzed the
behavior of the MAVLink protocol using both UDP and TCP
connections through 4G network.
In [56], the authors proposed an IoT architecture of different
types of systems including UAVs, sensor devices and mobile
phones. The communication between UAVs and the server was
performed using the MAVLink protocol.
The work in [57] aimed to create an framework where
the drones might be used to support the communication in
areas having no or limited infrastructure. The focus is on
the point-to-point connection between drone and car in an
ad-hoc communication. The position information is received
from the UAV’s GPS using MAVLink protocol, which allows
the communication between the drone’s hardware and the
Raspberry Pi.
C. Simulation and Modeling
Several research works proposed simulation frameworks
and evaluated the performance of MAVLink-based unmanned
aerial systems.
The work in [58] analyzed the data loss and network
latency in the communication channel between the ground
station and the autopilot. The work in [59] describes a
simulator for MAVLink-based UAVs. The proposed visual
simulator combines SITL simulator which uses MAVLink for
the communication with a scene model generated in OpenGL
environment which allows visualizing the actions executed by
the simulated UAV.
The work in [60] designed a Hardware-In-the-Loop testbed
to test and simulate a control system for tail-sitter UAV.
MAVLink is used to exchange messages between the vehicle
and the GCS. The work in [61], introduced a new simulator
called ArduSim which allows to control UAV flights in real-
time and manage the communication between multiple UAVs.
The MAVLink is used to send the control messages via TCP.
In [62], the authors proposed a modular hardware-in-the-loop
(HITL) simulation framework for multi-vehicle autonomous
systems. The proposed simulation framework is compatible
with any ground control station that operates MAVLink pro-
tocol over UDP.
The work in [63] addressed the development of a method-
ology for automated modeling of collaborative underwater
vehicles. The MAVLink protocol is used to communicate
with the Pixhawk autopilot and the Odroid-XU4 single board
computer of the robot.
The work in [64] proposed a framework that combines
different verification methods (simulation, symbolic, and sta-
tistical and model checking) to analyze the different stages of
drone development. The proposed framework is composed of 3
main components: (1) Simulator: to specify the physical model
of the drone, (2) formal executable language: used to specify
the drone behavior and environment, (3) statistical model
checking algorithm: used to analyze the system behavior. The
communication uses the MAVProxy ground station that acts as
a proxy that forwards the MAVLink commands to the drone.
D. Applications
The MAVLink protocol is used as a communication protocol
in a wide range of UAV applications, ranging from agriculture,
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construction, and environment monitoring. In what follows, we
present an overview of some applications.
In Agriculture applications, the work in [65] proposed a
system for crop monitoring through a multispectral camera
mounted on a UAV. The MAVLink protocol is used for the
wireless communication between the UAV to the ground sta-
tion to send the multispectral crop images through telemetry.
In the context of environmental monitoring applications,
the work in [66] proposed an autonomous underwater vehicle
system for cooperative environmental sensing. The MAVlink
protocol is used to handle the communication between the
modules, in addition the base station workstation. In [67], the
authors developed an autonomous drone for the monitoring
of oil and gas pipelines. All the data are transmitted using
the MAVLink protocol, which ensures reliable communication
within a 5-km radius. For construction inspections, the work
in [68], proposed to integrate UAVs for inspection purposes
and used MAVLink for communication between Ground Con-
trol Stations and UAVs. For Maritime application, the work
in [69] proposed an architecture for maritime surveillance
using battery-powered drones. The MAVLink protocol was
used to exchange data between the autopilot and the flight
duration enhancement system.
In addition, several recent research works addressed disaster
management applications, such as [70] and [71]. In [70], the
authors developed a fleet of UAVs for research and rescue
applications. Rescue operations are sent from mobile phone to
the drones through the MAVProxy ground station. The work
in [71] proposed an agent-hardware integration architecture
for search and rescue operations. The proposed architecture
embeds JaCaMo agents on UAVs. The UAV’s flight controller
exchanges data via MAVLink protocol.
E. Autonomous Agents
There are several efforts have been made to make the
UAVs autonomous. In [52], authors proposed an architecture
to provide the UAV with the capability of locating itself using
computer vision, modeling its environment, and planning and
executing a 3D trajectories. The work was successfully tested
with Solo from 3D Robotics which compatible with MAVLink.
Gstreamer is used to receive the video feed, and Dronekit,
which is compatible with MAVLink, is used to gain access
to the vehicle. In [72], authors deal with precision landing
problem for UAVs. As the GPS quality reduced when the
drone gets close to the ground, this paper proposed using
low cost adaptive fuzzy multi-sensor data fusion architec-
ture. PX4FLOW sensor is used to get an accurate velocity
measurement and recognize the moving features. PX4FLOW
data was acquired using the MAVlink protocol. The work in
[73] presents a system designed for multicopters to enable
them from autonomous landing on a moving object. The
presented system is based on visual tracking and landing of
a marker on the object. The MAVLink protocol is used for
the communication between the autopilot simulator and the
rest of the system. The work in [74] proposed an algorithm to
quantify the risk in a population and to find the optimal path
with minimum risk. The proposed algorithm consists of two
phases: first, identify the risk in a specific area by generating
a risk map based on factors like population density, no-fly
zones, sheltering, and obstacles. The second phase is the path
planning algorithm to search for the best path that minimizes
the risk. The communication between the autopilot and ROS
is done using MAVLink protocol.
The work in [75] proposed an algorithm for offline path
planning in a static environment. The proposed algorithm
was tested with real UAV. The algorithm runs on a single-
board computer onboard (Odroid XU4) To allow a completely
autonomous flight. The proposed system was tested using
Iris+, a ready-to-fly quadcopter from 3DRobotics to demon-
strate the efficiency of the proposed system in practice. The
Pixhawk flight control board is used to control the Iris+. The
communication with the Pixhawk is done using MAVLink.
F. Swarm Control
In [53], authors presented an algorithm to avoid collisions
for a swarm of UAVs. The authors used small quadrotors with
diameter 250mm equipped with GPS and distance sensors.
An embedded Linux computer (Raspberry Pi) and Pixhawk
autopilot board are used to control the UAVs. The control
algorithm runs on the Raspberry Pi and is implemented as
C++ package in the ROS platform. The MAVLink protocol is
used for the communication between the Raspberry Pi and the
Pixhawk.
The work in [76] proposed a decentralized control algorithm
to be executed by each drone on the local onboard com-
puter (Raspberry Pi). The proposed algorithm implemented as
Python scripts, and in each iteration after computing the de-
sired velocity, they sent to the flight control through MAVLink
using DroneKit Python interface.
VI. MAVLINK RELATED SOFTWARE
There several types of software that support the MAVLink
protocol, including (i.) ground stations, (ii.) Simulation frame-
works. In the following subsections, we provide the main
candidates for each category.
A. Supported Ground Stations
A Ground Station is a software that communicates with
the micro-vehicle through a serial or network interface by ex-
changing MAVLink messages. The communication can either
take place over a serial port generally through a telemetry
device or through a network interface inside a wireless local
area network using UDP or the protocol. The advantage of
telemetry devices is that they allow more extended com-
munication range than traditional WLAN technologies, and
can reach up to 5 km in range. This section presents the
most common available ground stations. Table VI shows a
comparison of each GCS software discussed in this section.
• QGroundControl: The most commonly used ground
station is QGroundControl [77]. This ground station
was natively developed in C++ and also has a wrapper
package for Android. It fully supports the MAVLink
protocol in addition to Ardupilot and PX4 powered
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vehicles. QGroundControl has several functionalities, in-
cluding defining and planning autonomous missions, full
control of the vehicle, graphical visualization of the map
and location tracking of the vehicle through its GPS
coordinates. It also provides support for video streaming
and changing the internal parameters of the autopilot, in
addition to the calibration of the sensors of the autopilot.
QGroundControl runs on different platforms, namely,
Windows, Mac OS, IOS, and Android devices.
• Mission Planner: Is the second most popular ground sta-
tions for MAVLink-vehicles [78]. It is created by Michael
Oborne and runs on Windows platforms only. Similarly
to QGroundControl, Mission Planner also allows for
planning an autonomous mission and making full control
of the MAVLink vehicle. It has an additional feature of
downloading and analyzing the log files of a mission.
This means after completing any mission or operation of
the unmanned systems, all internal parameters and state
variables are stored in log files inside the autopilot, which
can be download and analyzed by the Mission Planner.
This helps you to understand how the autopilot behaves
and provides a means to analyze any exotic behavior and
analyze the performance of the autopilot.
• APM Planner 2.0: Is also a ground station software that
is very similar to mission planner but is also available
for both MAC OS and Linux environments [79]. It is
considered as the best ground station to use for MAC
and Ubuntu operating systems. APM Planner 2.0 provides
almost all the functionalities of Mission Planner including
analyzing log files.
• MAVProxy: Is a Linux-based ground station, that is
primarily a command line interface and console-based
interface with some graphical modules for map visual-
ization and mission editing [80]. MAVProxy is written
in Python. It uses a set of simple command to interact
with Ardupilot autopilot. The advantage of MAVProxy is
that it is portable and lightweight as compared to other
ground stations, and also quite easy to use.
• DroidPlanner: For Android devices, DroidPlanner is
also known as Tower software, is the best alternative
for Android devices [81]. DroidPlanner relies on a Java
ground station at a lower level that interfaces with the
users through an Android GUI. It presents an excellent
interface to interact with an autopilot through either
serial telemetry interfaces and also network interfaces
using both UDP and TCP like other ground stations. It
also allows the user to configure the parameters of the
autopilot and create missions on the fly. Nonetheless, it
does not analyze log files like Mission Planner and APM
Planner 2.
• Universal Ground Control Software (UGCS): It is
a simple desktop software solution able to commu-
nicate with and control multiple unmanned systems
simultaneously [82]. It also supports various autopi-
lots from different manufacturers such as APM, Pix-
hawk, DJI, Mikrokopter, YUNEEC, Micropilot, Micro
unmanned systems, Parrot (Ar.unmanned system ) and
other MAVLink compatible. UGCS supports several map
layers and map providers. It provides a much more robust
interface with many features such as NFZs and immersive
3D simulation. It runs on different platforms, namely,
Windows, Mac OS, Ubuntu, iOS and Android devices
[83].
B. Unmanned Systems Simulators
Unmanned systems simulator help simulating any environ-
ment and any unmanned systems activities in a digital environ-
ment to make easier the test and the validation of algorithms
and protocols developed for the UAVs. The choice of the
appropriate simulator depends on the objectives, the areas
of application and the functionalities given by the simulator.
Table VII provides a comparison between unmanned systems
simulators discussed in this section.
• FlightGear: Is a free, open-source flight simulator frame-
work used for research and academic environments [84].
It works on different environment such as Windows, Mac,
and Linux operating systems platforms [85]. The entire
source code is available for modification and published
under the General Public License (GPL). Aircraft models
must be created by an external 3D modeling application.
Typically, the UAV structure and features are described by
an XML file. FlightGear can run Software-In-The-Loop
(SITL) and Hardware-In-The-Loop (HITL).
• UE4Sim: In 2017, the Unreal Engine (UE4) is developed
at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology,
based on the open-source computer game engine Unreal
Engine (UE4) [86]. The simulator has been designed
to facilitate the integration of computer vision and ma-
chine learning techniques into a realistic looking 3D
environment. UE4Sim gives accurate unmanned system
physics, an evaluation tool based on the latest advanced
tracking algorithms, and a deep learning interface based
on TensorFlow for autonomous driving without requiring
manually collected training data.
• X-Plane: Is a commercial flight simulator produced
by Laminar Research [87]. X-Plane simulator works
on different environment, namely, Windows, Linux, and
Android. It is certified by the FAA (Federal Aviation
Administration) as a training simulator because it is
more flexible and offers high fidelity simulation than
the flight model when it is used with specific hardware
configurations [88]. The flight model was created using
the Plane-Maker, an application provided with X-Plane.
This tool allows users to design any aircraft based on
the vehicle’s physical specifications. X-Plane uses UDP
or TCP-based protocols to connect different instances
through a network. X-Plane can exchange information
through the UDP communication protocol, which guar-
antees high-speed data traffic.
• Aerial Informatics and Robotics Platform (AirSim):
This simulator was produced in 2017 by Microsoft to
develop and test deep learning, computer vision, and re-
inforcement learning algorithms for autonomous vehicle
applications [89]. It is open-source, cross-platform, built
on Unreal Engine 4 (UE4), and supports SITL and HITL
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TABLE VI: An overview comparison between GCS software
GCS software Free/commercial Interface
Supported
Autopilots Platforms
MAVLink
compatible
Implementation
language License
QGroundControl Free Graphical
PX4 Pro, ArduPilot (APM)
or any vehicle that
communicates using
the MAVLink protocol.
Windows/Mac/Linux/iOS
and Android devices Yes C++
Open Source
(GPLv3)
Mission Planner Free Graphical APM/PX4 Windows/Mac OS (Using Mono) Yes C# Open source(GPLv3)
APM Planner 2.0 Free Graphical
MAVlink based
autopilots including
APM and PX4/Pixhawk
Windows, Mac OS, and Linux Yes C++ Open source(GPLv3)
MAVProxy Free
Command line
and console
based interface
Ardupilot MAVLink
compatible Linux Yes Python
Open source
(GPLv3)
DroidPlanner Free Graphical APM Android Phones and Tablets Yes Java Open source(GPLv3)
UGCS
Free version
with limited
capabilities
Graphical
APM, Pixhawk, DJI,
Mikrokopter, YUNEEC,
Micropilot, Microunmanned systems,
Lokheed Martin, Parrot (Ar.unmanned system)
and other MAVLink compatible
multirotors, fixed wings
and VTOLs
Windows, Mac OS,
Ubuntu, Android, iOS Yes
Human control
interface with C#,
Universal control
server with JAVA,
Vehicle specific layer
with Java or C++
Not open source with
a free licence available
TABLE VII: Comparison between unmanned systems simulators
Simulator Main domain Commercial/free
Implementation
language Open source
Operating
systems License
Supported
Vehicles
MAVLink
compatible
ROS
interface SITL/HITL
FlightGear unmanned systems Free C, C++ Yes
Windows, Linux,
Mac OS-X, IRIX
FreeBSD, Solaris
GNU/GPL Aircraft, unmanned systems Yes No Yes
UE4Sim Vehicles Free Python, C++, Yes unmanned systems, cars No No No
X-Plane unmanned systems Commercial C++ No
Android, iOS, Linux,
MacOS, WebOS,
Windows
Proprietary with
Free Trial Plane Yes No HITL
AirSim unmanned systems, cars Free C++, Python,C#, Java Yes Windows, Linux MIT
Iris (MultiRotor model
and a configuration
for PX4 QuadRotor in
the X configuration)
Yes No Yes
Gazebo Robots Free C++,JavaScript Yes
Linux, Mac
Windows Apache V2.0
Quad ( Iris and Solo),
Hex (Typhoon H480),
Generic quad delta VTOL,
Tailsitter, Plane, Rover,
Yes Yes Yes
jMAVSim unmanned systems Free JAVA Yes Linux, MacOs,Windows BSD 3 Multirotor/Quad Yes Yes Yes
with popular flight controllers such as Ardupilot and PX4
with the possibility of interfacing with MAVLink protocol
to render the simulation more realistic [90].
AirSim can retrieve data, images, control and interact
with the vehicle based on APIs, via C++, Python, C# and
Java languages. However, AirSim simulation is limited
to quadunmanned systems. AirSim does not support
ROS and cloud connectivity [91]. This simulator is also
computation-extensive and needs advanced computing
requirements as compared to other simulators.
• Gazebo: Is an open source simulation tool for robots
and vehicles used for several applications [92]. This
simulator was developed at the University of Southern
California and currently managed by the Open Source
Robotics Foundation (OSRF). It supports different robots
and can simulate complex 3D virtual worlds with sup-
porting various physical simulation engines and different
sensors, to test robot designs and AI algorithms using
real scenarios. Gazebo supports Ardupilot and PX4 with
the ability to run Software In The Loop and Hardware-
In-Tl-Loop. An API is provided allowing the creation
of new sensors for Gazebo. Moreover, Gazebo is one of
the most popular simulators since it enables multi-robot
simulation, supports ROS and enables cloud connectivity
[93]. However, it is too computationally demanding to
simulate multi-vehicle operations in real-time [94].
• Java Micro Air Vehicle Simulator (jMAVSim): Is
a Java UAV simulator developed by the PIXHAWK
engineering team [95]. The main advantage of jMAVSim
is that it is simple to use and lighweight. jMAVSim
allows flying unmanned system type vehicles running
PX4 around a simulated world. It supports the MAVLink
protocol with the possibility to run SITL via UDP and
HITL via a serial connection. It supports ROS and uses
a Java3D library for graphical visualization. There is no
possibility to integrate other sensors in the simulation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive survey on the
MAVLink protocol, which is a lightweight protocol for com-
munication with unmanned systems. This survey addresses
the need for having a technical reference for MAVLink-based
systems developers. We thorough presented the characteristics
of the MAVLink protocol version 1 and version 2 and their
messages formats. Furthermore, we discussed the MAVLink
security requirements, threats, possible solutions, and we
presented the recent research works that dealt with security
aspects of MAVLink. We also presented a comprehensive
literature review of related research works about MAVLink.
We believe that this survey provides a handy reference for
the large community of practitioners and developers to learn
about the MAVLink protocol, in particular with the absence
of any technical coverage of MAVLink except some online
documentation resources.
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